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RESPONSE

Exaggerated and Misleading Reports of the Death
of Conditional Relevance
Peter Tillers*
I

In 1980 the late Professor Vaughn C. Ball of the University of
Georgia published an arttcle called The Myth of Conditional Relevancy.1 Ball's article is widely admired. One well-known evidence
scholar, Ronald J. Allen, liked Ball's article so much that he borrowed its title word for word.2 Although the extent of Allen's enthusiasm for Ball's analysis may be unmatched, a good number of
students of evidence - including this writer - have said that Ball's
analysis of conditional relevance is both original and important.3
Richard Friedman, by contrast, cannot be counted as one of Ball's
more ardent admirers. Although Friedman does show due respect
for Ball in his article in this issue of the Michigan Law Review, 4 he
also finds fault with some parts of Ball's argument.
Friedman's article is an important one. It is important in part
precisely because Friedman's view of the problem of conditional
relevance and conditional probative value is distinctive.s In addition, Friedman's article effectively serves as a timely reminder of a
fundamental property of inference from evidence in the judicial
process, namely, the hierarchical or chain-like character of factual
inference in contexts such as adjudication. Friedman's argument
about how judges should be directed to handle challenges to the
admissibility of conditionally relevant and conditionally probative
* Professor of Law & Director, International Seminar on Evidence in Litigation,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. A.B. 1966, Yale; J.D. 1969, L.L.M.
1972, Harvard. - Ed.
1. Vaughn C. Ball, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REV. 435 (1980).
2. Ronald J. Allen, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 871 (1992).
3. See, e.g., 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 14.1, at 724-30 (Tiilers rev. ed. 1983)
[hereinafter WIGMORE (Tiilers ed.)]; Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 10
B.U. L. REv. 447, 448 (1990).
4. Richard Friedman, Conditional Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth, 93
MICH. L. REV. - (1994).
5. Friedman views conditional relevance as a special case of conditional probative value.
Friedman, supra note 4, at (7-8 & 8 n.20].
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evidence is likely to provoke a new round of much-needed scholarly
debate about the more general and very important question of how
the law should deal with the ineluctable phenomenon of hierarchical inference.
II

Friedman's article needs to be considered in context. The starting point is Ball's truly seminal 1980 article. Professor Ball was apparently a blunt fellow. He argued that the doctrine of conditional
relevance is incoherent and unmanageable and that we ought to get
rid of it. Friedman's general view of the conditional relevance doctrine is rather different from Ball's. Although Friedman agrees
with Ball that the doctrine as it stands has flaws, he also sees a core
of good sense in it. Hence, instead of arguing that the doctrine
ought to be abolished, as Ball proposed, Friedman favors modifying
it.
Friedman is clearly right about one thing: there is a core of
good sense in the conditional relevance doctrine. It is important to
make a distinction between the phenomenon of conditional relevance and conditional probative value, on the one hand, and the
legal rules governing that phenomenon, on the other hand.6 If we
wish, we can abolish the legal doctrines now governing conditional
relevance and conditional probative value. Try as we might, however, we cannot get rid of the phenomenon of conditional relevance
- or, more broadly speaking, the phenomenon of conditional probative value. Practically every inference from evidence to a fact in
issue in litigation - and possibly every such inference - involves a
series of inferences rather than just a single inference; that is, practically every inference from evidence to a factum probandum in a
lawsuit involves a chain, or network, of inferences.7 Hence, the
force of any single inference is practically always contingent upon,
or affected by, at least one other inference.8
6. Some years ago I made this point in a slightly different way. I said then that it is
important to draw a distinction between conditional relevance as a legal doctrine and conditional relevance as an analytical concept. See WIGMORE (Tillers ed.}, supra note 3, § 14.1, at
703.
7. The chain-like character of inference has been recognized by many observers. See, e.g.,
EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 185-86 (1963); DAVID A. SCHUM,
THE EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABIUSTIC REASONING §§ 2.2.5, 3.1.3-.6 (1994); cf.
Albert J. Moore, Inferential Streams: The Articulation and Illustration of the Trial Advocate's
Evidentiary Intuitions, 34 UCLA L. REv. 611 (1987).
8. Ball's view of the existence of the phenomenon of conditional relevance is unclear. I
would like to think that Ball attacked conditional relevance as a "myth" only because he
thought that the existing doctrine of conditional relevance rests on tire mistaken assumption
that the phenomenon of conditional relevance is rare. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 1, at 455-56
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Ball himself fully understood that the relevance of a great deal
of evidence about a fact in issue - and possibly of all such evidence - is in some sense contingent upon inferences about other
facts. Ball's own critique of the conditional relevance doctrine rests
in part on his thesis that the relevance of practically all evidence is
in some sense conditional.9 Friedman's article, however, exposes a
significant weakness in Ball's argument. Even if one believes - as
I do - that Ball's expose of the flaws in the conditional relevance
doctrine is generally on target, Friedman's argument shows that it is
far from clear that Ball's proposed remedy for those flaws is the
correct one.
Ball's proposed remedy for the defects in the present conditional relevance doctrine is the absence of any legal rule about conditional relevance or conditional probative value; Ball wanted to
abolish the doctrine without replacing it with a different one.to
Although Friedman agrees with Ball that the conditional relevance
doctrine as it now stands invites inappropriate judicial intervention
in the fact-finding activities of juries, Friedman rejects Ball's proposal for the complete abolition of the conditional relevance doctrine.
Friedman advocates replacing the existing conditional relevance
rule with a rule about conditionally probative evidence. (Friedman
views conditional relevance as a special case of the more general
phenomenon of conditional probative value. I think Friedman is
right about this point.)
Ball saw no need to replace the existing conditional relevance
doctrine with an improved or different version of the doctrine. Ball
believed that when a challenge is made to the relevance of conditionally relevant evidence, trial judges should do what they already
do - or are supposed to do - when the relevance of any kind of
evidence is questioned. And what are trial judges ordinarily supposed to do? How are they supposed to determipe whether evidence is relevant? According to Ball, trial judges should articulate,
or ask a lawyer in the case to articulate, one or more "evidential
hypotheses" - which today we te.nd to call "generalizations" (discussing the frequency of conditionally relevant evidence under the existing conditional
relevance rule); see also id. at 460 ("I believe that all offered evidence is conditionally relevant, but that the conditions for relevancy are far other than those supposed in the received
doctrine of conditional relevancy."). Nonetheless, as Friedman points out, see Friedman,
supra note 4, at [6-7] n.17, in one part of his article Ball did go to considerable lengths in an
apparent effort to show that conditional relevance problems do not really involve the phenomenon of conditional relevance. See Ball, supra note 1, at 466-69 n.38.
9. Ball, supra note 1, at 460.
10. Id. at 466-69.
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that appear to have the possibility of establishing a link between the
challenged evidence and the fact in issue, the factum probandum.11
The trial· judge should then m?ke a judgment about whether any
such evidential hypothesis or generalization does in fact offer any
(perceptible?) support for the proposed inference, the factum
probandum.12

In one sense, it is difficult to quarrel with Ball's account of the
method that the trial judge should use to evaluate the relevance of
conditionally relevant evidence. It is difficult to do so because practically all reputable evidence scholars have agreed for quite some
time now that rational assessment of the force of a proposed factual
inference requires the articulation and evaluation of the generalizations that seem - initially, at least - to offer some support for
such an inference. So only a brave soul would venture to say that
Ball was wrong in believing that generalization~ play an important
part in judgments about the relevance of conditionally relevant evidence. Nonetheless, there is something unsatisfactory about Ball's
proposal that judges deal with problems of conditional relevance by
consciously attending to evidential hypotheses. The difficulty is
that Ball's proposed analytical technique is in certain respects uninstructive. Indeed, if we are prepared to say that we already know
about the importance of generalizations in inferential reasoning, we
may be entitled to say that Ball's proposed analytical method for
dealing with conditional relevance problems is vacuous.
The obvious difficulty with Ball's proposal is that it says nothing
at all about how trial judges should assess the relevance of evidence
when the trier of fact can reach the inference that the proponent of
the evidence wants to establish only by drawing at least one other
inference. In other words, Ball's proposed method of analysis does
not address the question of how the trial judge should deliberate
about the relevance of evidence when the proffered evidence leads
to .a fact in issue only by means of a chain of inferences. This is a
serious failing because conditional relevance problems belong to a
class of problems whose solution requires at least two separate inferences. In short, if we know or believe, as I do, that conditional
relevance problems - and, more generally, problems of conditional probative value - have distinctive characteristics,13 Ball's
11. Id. at 460.
12. Id. at 461-62.
13. When I say that the problem of conditionally relevant and conditionally probative
evidence is distinctive, I am not asserting or implying that such evidence is rare. (It is possible
that the relevance and probative value of most evidence - and possibly of all evidence -
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proposed analytical method for dealing with conditional relevance
problems seems unedifying. Ball's proposed analytical method may
speak to the question of how one assesses a single step in an inferential chain, but it seems to have nothing to say about how one
should assess the relationships among the links or parts of an inferential chain or network.
Unlike Ball, Friedman does make some claims - quite a few
claims, actually - about the structure of hierarchical inferential argument. Moreover, as I have already noted, Friedman advocates
the adoption of a conditional probative value rule that in some circumstances effectively directs trial judges to think about the hierarchical, or chain-like, nature of a problem of evidence. Hence,
whether or not Friedman is correct about the structure of hierarchical inferential problems or about how the law should handle such
problems, no one can accuse Friedman of responding to the problem of hierarchical inference by acting like an ostrich; Ball may
have dug his head in the sand but Friedman most certainly does not.
Whether or not Friedman's theory ultimately withstands scrutiny,
Friedman is to be praised simply for having a theory of conditional
relevance and probative value. The phenomenon of inferential
chains and webs is both real and widespread. It is wonderful to see
a theorist who, instead of ducking tough inferential problems,
tackles them.

III
Despite my admiration for Friedman's article, I am not yet prepared to endorse every part of Friedman's argument. In particular,
I do not yet have a firm opinion about whether the kinds of legal
rules Friedman recommends for dealing with problems of conditional relevance and conditional probative value are a good idea.
I see three or four general options for legal responses to the
problem of the admissibility of evidence whose relevance or probative value is conditional. One possible legal response - a response
favored by Ball - is to have no specific legal rule to address the
phenomenon of evidence whose relevance or probative value is
conditional.14 A second possible legal response is to have special,
are conditional.) I am only proposing that hierarchical inference has properties that are not
found in single-stage inference.
14. This option is not necessarily limited to scholars who share Ball's view that condi·
tional relevance problems are not sui generis. It is entirely conceivable that scholars who
believe in the distinctiveness of inferential problems with multiple steps also believe that it is
better not to have a legal rule that speaks directly about problems involving chains of inferences. One might take this view, for example, if one believes that we do not understand
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fixed ways of handling special categories of problems of conditional
relevance and conditional probative value; Professor Dale Nance
seems to lean in this direction.15 A third possible response is to call
for judges to make individualized, case-by-case determinations of
the relevance and probative value of conditionally relevant evidence and conditionally probative evidence, respectively. Finally,
there is a fourth possible legal response, at least theoretically speaking. The fourth option is to have a legal rule that directs trial judges
to use a particular analytical procedure in cases in which the relevance or probative value of conditionally probative evidence is
challenged.16
Friedman seems to prefer a species of the third type of legal
response described above; he seems ·to anticipate that under his
proposed rule about conditional probative value, trial judges would
make individualized, case-by-case determinations of the probative
value of conditionally probative evidence. However, I do not think
the case has yet been made that the third type of response is best.
More generally, it is not yet clear to me which of the three or four
legal options I have listed is best; I see possible problems with each
of them. For example, I worry that the conditional probative value
rule that Friedman favors will lead to wildly inconsistent rulings on
the admissibility of conditionally relevant and conditionally probative evidence. I also wonder whether trial judges who are enmeshed in real-world, fast-paced, resource-straitened trials would
have sufficient time to analyze problems of conditional probative
value with the degree of finesse and subtlety that Friedman's theory
seems to require. (If it can ever be said that the devil is in the
details, this can be said about details in inferential reasoning.) By
hierarchical inference well enough to prescribe by rule how judges should deal with complex
inferential problems.
15. See Nance, supra note 3, at 447-48, 472-75, 505-07. Nance has a unique perspective
on the conditional relevance doctrine. See generally id. Nance's perspective on conditional
relevance grows out of his more general theory concerning the "best evidence principle." See
Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 lowA L. REv. 227 (1988). Nance argues that
it is important to consider how rules of evidence, including the. conditional relevance doctrine, work over time; he maintains that if we wish to explain a rule of evidence such as the
conditional relevance rule, it is necessary - if not sufficient - to view such a rule as a
component, or ingredient, of a dynamic process. Nance further argues that when we look at
the conditional relevance rule from this point of view, we find, as a general matter, that the
best explanation or justification for the conditional relevance doctrine is the best evidence
principle. Nance, supra note 3, at 472-83. This thesis is provocative and profound; no one
who wishes to say anything important about conditional relevance can afford to ignore or
slight it.
16. I know of no one - including Friedman - who favors this fourth option; that is, thus
far no evidence scholar has had the hubris to advocate the express and complete codification
of the analytical technique that he or she happens to favor.
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the same token, I worry (for example) that the first option - the
option of having no rule at all concerning conditional relevance or
conditional probative value - will invite or permit judges to ignore
subtleties in problems of evidence that really are there.17
I have yet other worries, doubts, and concerns, both about
Friedman's proposed replacement for the conditional relevance
rule and about the two or three other types of possible legal responses to the phenomenon of conditionally relevant and conditionally probative evidence. So I am not yet sure that it would be a
good idea to abolish the existing conditional relevance doctrine and
to replace it with the conditional probative value rule that Friedman proposes in his article. But even if Friedman has not come up
with a convincing solution to the riddle of conditional relevance, he
has made a sophisticated and subtle argument for his proposed conditional probative value rule, and he deserves our praise for initiating a scholarly and professional conversation that eventually may
lead to a consensus.

17. Perhaps it is better to direct judges to think about such problems as best as they can
- while recognizing that they will sometimes err and not do their job as they might in more
ideal circumstances. If one takes this view, one might then favor the type of conditional
probative value rule that Friedman proposes.

